Commentary
What Risk Engineering Looked Like in 1937, According to Talkie-Box
An experiment with a modern model constrained by an older memory.
As my 21 years with Zurich Resilience Solutions comes to an end, I stumbled into a strange gift: Talkie-Box, a small modern LLM trained only on pre-1937 content.
By 1937, long before modern risk engineering had its current name, Zurich was already deep into the world of accident, liability, and workers’ compensation. So I decided to run a small experiment: What can we learn if we ask a 1937-shaped LLM to explain safety, accident prevention, and industrial risk from the viewpoint of Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company?
Since Talkie-Box is neither an archive nor primary source, this is not a history paper. Zurich’s own history provides the starting point; Talkie-Box provides a compressed, biased, incomplete reconstruction of the period.
That is what makes this interesting to me. We are not asking Talkie to tell us the truth about safety in 1937. We are learning what 1937 looks like after being compressed into a language model. And what came back was fascinating: some of it plausible, some flawed, some very old, and some uncomfortably current.
That also makes it a useful way to think about modern AI governance. The question is not whether the model is perfectly right. The question is what its mistakes, blind spots, and surprisingly durable patterns reveal about how organizations learn to see risk.
The Old Name for Risk Engineering
One of the first things I had to adjust was the language.
I wanted to ask Talkie about risk engineering, but that phrase is too modern. In 1937, the work would more likely have been called accident prevention, safety inspection, industrial safety, fire protection, boiler inspection, or loss prevention. So I asked Talkie to roleplay as a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer in 1937.
That worked. Talkie described real-world conditions, not abstract ideas. Its answers were physical. There were belts, shafts, boilers, dust, steam, coal, electric switchboards, rough floors, unguarded elevator shafts, and children working around dangerous machinery.
What Kept Underwriters Awake
When I asked what losses kept Zurich underwriters awake in 1937, Talkie did not start with balance sheets. It answered this way:
Not the amount of money paid out for death benefits or compensation, large as that may be. It is rather the number of cases which have to be handled - the suffering and loss of time imposed upon employees, the anxious days for the dependents of those killed or injured - these constitute the real burden.
That is a humane answer that frames 1937 as a hard year because of industrial accidents, economic pressure, construction activity, mining, inexperienced workers, and cost-cutting. Or course, Talkie’s explanation carried the assumptions of its period. It leaned heavily on the idea that workers became less careful during hard times:
In good times workmen are more careful about their safety; they take pride in their record of no accidents, or few. But when times are hard and men out of work, they do not have the same incentive to carefulness.
That is not how I would frame it today. But hidden inside the dated language is a systems pattern that still matters. Economic pressure changes behavior. Cost-cutting changes materials. Inexperience changes exposure. Production pressure changes the work.
The language blamed the worker. The pattern pointed to the system. That tension became the thread running through the experiment.
Machines Were Faster Than the Safeguards
When I asked Talkie what emerging hazards were being discussed by safety professionals in 1937, it first answered in broad categories:
The increasing use of mechanical power in industry and on the farm. The rapid growth of large-scale production. The introduction of new types and makes of machines and materials. The rapid increase in the number of workers employed. The creation of new types of jobs.
While Talkie did not name the pattern, it did spot it: New capability was arriving faster than mature safety practice. When I pushed further, Talkie explained:
The introduction of new types and makes of machines and materials has been so rapid that industry as a whole has not had time to learn about the hazards of these new things.
Sound familiar? We have many of the same concerns today about AI, cloud platforms, automation, robotics, or any other fast-moving technical system.
The substrate changes. The pattern persists. In 1937, the machine was a press, a line shaft, a boiler, or a power-driven planer.
Today, the machine may be an AI model, a workflow automation platform, a supply chain dependency, a recommender system, or a decision engine. The old lesson still holds: New capability usually arrives before mature safety practice.
The Factory Floor
The best responses came when I forced Talkie out of conference mode and onto the factory floor.
I asked it to describe a Midwestern manufacturing plant after several serious injuries. It gave me rough floors, screw machines, unguarded planers, line shafts, elevator shafts, and stairways.
Some of the answer broke down. Talkie repeated itself. It confused stairways with elevator shafts. It gave recommendations that were sometimes thin or oddly phrased.
But the pattern was still useful:
The second dangerous condition is lack of safeguards on an unguarded planer. Workmen can easily get their hands or fingers caught between the moving parts while oiling, adjusting belts, or cleaning up.
That is old industrial safety in one sentence: moving parts, routine maintenance, inadequate guarding, injury during ordinary work.
Talkie also described a line-shaft hazard:
A workman may easily get his coat caught in the revolving shaft while cleaning windows or adjusting a belt.
This is the kind of hazard that modern readers may struggle to feel. We no longer live around exposed rotating power transmission systems in ordinary workplaces. But for earlier industrial workers, these hazards were part of the room. The danger was not hidden in code or policy. It was spinning above them.
The Worker Who “Did Not Know”
One of Talkie’s most revealing patterns was its repeated return to inexperience. When asked what hazard industry was ignoring, Talkie answered:
I believe one of the most widespread hazards, and one which will become increasingly serious as industry grows in complexity, is that of the worker who does not know how to use his hands.
While this sounds a bit condescending today, Talkie further explained that:
We have found that this ignorance is a result of wrong training or no training at all.
And there it is. Talkie begins with the worker, but when pressed, it finds training, job design, instruction, and supervision. The blame starts with the hand; the explanation moves back into the system.
It says workers do not know how to avoid moving parts, oil machinery safely, or use safety appliances. That can sound like blame. But it can also be read as an early recognition that safety is not produced by warnings alone.
A worker cannot be expected to avoid a hazard that the system has not explained, guarded, slowed, ventilated, or designed out.
Modern organizations still describe failures as user error, poor adoption, lack of training, resistance to change, careless prompting, or misuse of tools.
Sometimes that is true at the surface. But beneath the surface, the same questions return:
- Did the organization design the work safely?
- Did it train people well?
- Did it create conditions where ordinary people could succeed without heroics?
- Did it build the guard before blaming the hand?
Slow Harms Are Harder to See
The traumatic injuries were easy for Talkie to describe. Machinery grabbed hair. Presses crushed hands. Falls of rock killed quarry workers. Electric shock killed a man at a switchboard.
The slower harms were harder. When I asked about occupational illnesses, Talkie did recognize that some diseases develop slowly and are harder to detect:
The employer is not interested in them as he would be if they occurred suddenly, nor does the worker realize that his illness is due to his occupation until it has reached an advanced stage.
That is one of the strongest lines in the whole experiment. Talkie named miners’ nystagmus, compressed-air illness, and caisson disease. When I later asked about dust, fumes, poor ventilation, and coughing, it gave a better answer:
I recognize as serious the hazards of dust, fumes, and poor ventilation.
It also noted:
The workers may not know that they are breathing dusty or poisonous air, and thus be unaware of the hazards to which they are subjected.
That is the slow-harm problem. A machine injury announces itself immediately. Dust does not. Fumes may not. Repeated exposure often waits years before sending the bill.
This is another old pattern with modern descendants. Some risks arrive as accidents. Others arrive as drift.
In modern organizations, the slow harms may be deskilling, overdependence on automation, quiet bias in decision systems, brittle vendor dependencies, burnout, surveillance creep, or gradual erosion of trust.
They do not always look like accidents while they are happening. Sometimes the hazard is in the air.
The Inspector Had a Clipboard, Not a Magic Wand
I also wanted to know what power this 1937 accident prevention engineer thought he actually had. Talkie gave a grounded answer:
I can only report the matter to my underwriting. They will investigate, and if they find that the conditions are serious enough to warrant it, they may cancel the insurance on that risk or even refuse to write any more business there.
That is important. The inspector could inspect, report, recommend, and escalate. Underwriting could apply pressure. Insurance could influence behavior. But the inspector was not a magical safety authority. The system could see more than it could always change.
That has not disappeared. Many modern risk roles operate the same way. Risk teams, security teams, compliance teams, data governance teams, model governance teams, and responsible AI teams often have influence before they have direct control.
They can identify the hazard. They can write the report. They can escalate the concern. They can recommend corrective action.
But whether the organization slows down, spends money, changes the process, or accepts the risk is often decided somewhere else.
The Disagreement That Still Feels Familiar
One of the most useful prompts asked Talkie to describe a disagreement between a factory owner and a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer.
Talkie invented Herr Wohlfahrt, the engineer, and Herr Rektor, the textile mill owner. That matters: this was not a historical anecdote. It was a generated parable, and the hallucination is part of what makes the exchange revealing. The engineer wanted a dangerous process corrected. The owner resisted because the business was not making money and the safer process cost more. Talkie summarized the owner’s position this way:
He could not see why his employees should be protected at his expense.
That line is the whole argument.
In the invented story, the compromise was weak. The board decided to keep the old process for two years unless an accident occurred that proved the engineer was right.
That is a brutal little pattern: Wait for the loss, then decide whether the prevention was worth it.
This is not only a 1937 problem. Modern organizations still do versions of this. We wait for incidents to justify controls. We wait for claims to justify investment. We wait for evidence, even when the evidence is likely to arrive in the form of harm.
To be fair, not every theoretical risk deserves immediate investment. Businesses have to make decisions under uncertainty. But when the same risk pattern keeps showing up across history, we should at least notice the smell of smoke before asking whether the building is technically on fire.
What Was Understood, and What Was Not
Talkie’s answers gave a useful split. Some things were understood clearly:
- Moving machinery injures people.
- Inexperienced workers are at higher risk.
- Poor guarding leads to severe injury.
- Bad ventilation, dust, and fumes matter.
- Children should not be placed in hazardous industrial work.
- Education and training are part of accident prevention.
Other things were only partially understood:
- Chronic illness was harder to connect to work.
- System design was visible, but worker blame still dominated the first explanation.
- Insurance had leverage, but not full authority.
- Economic pressure was recognized, but often described through worker behavior rather than management choices.
- New technology was known to create new hazards, but specific future harms were difficult to imagine.
The Hardest Hazards to Foresee
I asked Talkie what future industrial hazards would be hardest for an accident prevention engineer to understand. The first answer reached for new chemicals, short-wave light, high-frequency light, and experimental machinery. That was interesting, but I pushed it away from specific predictions and toward the general pattern. Then Talkie gave the useful answer:
In any industry, the most difficult accidents for the accident prevention engineer to foresee are those which occur in situations that have not yet been studied or investigated.
That is the heart of the matter. The hardest risks are not always the strangest ones. They are the risks in areas where experience has not accumulated yet.
- New process.
- New material.
- New scale.
- New speed.
- New worker population.
- New dependency.
- New feedback loop.
- New thing that has not failed enough times for us to name the failure pattern.
That may be the strongest comparison between 1937 industrial safety and modern AI governance.
- We do not always lack intelligence. We lack incident history.
- We lack shared language.
- We lack inspection habits.
- We lack humility about systems we have not yet seen fail at scale.
The Lesson Learned Too Late
For my final prompt, I asked Talkie: Looking back over your career, what safety lesson did industry learn too late?
Its answer was flawed, dated, and good:
A most important one - the danger of employing boys and girls in places of great hazard.
Then it continued:
The employer who has not learned this lesson, and does not profit by it, is guilty of a crime against childhood.
That is a strong line. Talkie then turned toward education as the central lesson of accident prevention:
The great value of education in accident prevention. Education, not only of employers and managers but also of employees; for no matter how perfect a safety system may be, it will not function properly unless the workmen understand and appreciate its purpose.
And then:
The best safety device ever invented, if left to itself, will do no more than perform the function for which it was designed. But when a man understands why that device is there, and what will happen if he fails to use it, his intelligence becomes an active force behind the machine in safeguarding him from injury.
Again, the language is old. The assumptions are old. The worker is still doing too much of the carrying. But the pattern has advanced: by this point, Talkie has moved from blaming the worker, to naming training, to recognizing that safety depends on design, education, authority, and shared memory.
But there is wisdom there. Safety is not only a device. It is not only a rule. It is not only a report. It is a relationship between people, tools, incentives, education, inspection, authority, and memory.
The Mirror
Talkie provided a compressed memory of 1937: biased, partial, confident in places where it should have been cautious, and occasionally insightful in ways that surprised me.
That makes it a useful mirror, but not an oracle. And not a clean mirror, but clear enough to show us how the old industrial hazards map to our current ones. The machinery has changed. The challenge pattern has not.
- New capabilities still arrive before mature safeguards.
- Workers are still blamed for failures created by poor systems.
- Slow harms are still harder to see than sudden accidents.
- Inspectors still have influence before they have authority.
- Businesses still struggle to invest in prevention before the loss arrives.
And every generation still has hazards it can see clearly, hazards it explains badly, and hazards it cannot yet imagine.
As I start a new chapter, that feels like a fitting lesson to carry forward. Managing risk has always been a conversation between what already went wrong and what might go wrong next.
Appendix
The transcripts of my conversation with Talkie-Box about Zurich and Safety in 1937.
🏢 Zurich in 1937
Prompt: Tell me about Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company.
Talkie:
It is one of the most substantial of the European casualty companies, possessing ample capital, a large fund of experience in workmen’s compensation insurance, and a highly trained staff. It was founded in 1873 as an accident company, but in 1891 it added liability insurance to its activities and became the Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company. It has a capital of 10,000,000 francs, fully paid up, and in addition to this it has a reserve fund of 30,000,000 francs. Its reserves for unexpired risks amount to nearly 60,000,000 francs and its total assets are over 90,000,000 francs.
The company has had an exceedingly favorable experience in workmen’s compensation insurance and it is able to offer its clients the benefit of this.
Prompt: What are some of the principal features in its policy?
Talkie:
The Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company has a very liberal policy. It pays for the first thirteen weeks of total disability, and after that period it pays a weekly indemnity of 66⅔ per cent. of the wages, subject to a maximum of 50 francs and a minimum of 12½ francs per week. It pays for partial disability according to the extent of the impairment of earning power, but in no case does it pay less than one-fourth wages. It pays funeral benefits and also medical expenses for the first thirteen weeks, but it does not pay any compensation after fourteen years from the date of injury. It has a very liberal rule about subrogation, and it pays its claims promptly.
Prompt: How does the Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company compare with other companies in respect to its treatment of injured employees?
Talkie:
The Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company has an excellent record in the matter of settling claims. It pays its injured employees promptly and it adjusts their claims fairly and equitably, without taking advantage of technicalities.
😴 What Kept Underwriters Awake
Prompt: What losses keep Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company underwriters awake at night in 1937?
Talkie:
Not the amount of money paid out for death benefits or compensation, large as that may be. It is rather the number of cases which have to be handled—the suffering and loss of time imposed upon employees, the anxious days for the dependents of those killed or injured—these constitute the real burden. In this respect 1937 was a particularly hard year.
Prompt: Why did it have such an effect upon your underwriters?
Talkie:
Because of the great increase in industrial accidents and deaths, due primarily to the severe economic depression. In good times workmen are more careful about their safety; they take pride in their record of no accidents, or few. But when times are hard and men out of work, they do not have the same incentive to carefulness. The danger of accident is increased by their being in a more or less subnormal mental condition, and they do not take the same pains as usual to protect themselves.
Prompt: Was this true of all industries, or only some?
Talkie:
It was true in a greater or lesser degree of practically all industries, but there were some which suffered much more than others. In the building trades, for instance, the number of fatal accidents was nearly double that of 1936. This was due largely to the great amount of construction work which had to be done in order to provide shelter for those out of employment, and also because many builders were forced by lack of funds to use inferior materials and workmanship in order to keep down costs. The result was that there were many accidents caused by the collapse of scaffolds, or walls which had been built too hastily.
Prompt: Did your company suffer from these accidents?
Talkie:
Yes, we paid out a considerable amount in death benefits and compensation. And the number of cases was much greater than normal because many injured workmen were not able to report for treatment until after the lapse of several days. This was due largely to their financial condition, and also because they had no one to take care of their injuries for them. They were too proud or independent to report for treatment as soon as they should have done.
Prompt: What about accidents in mines and quarries?
Talkie:
In these industries also there was a great increase in the number of accidents. This was partly due to the fact that many mines had to be reopened and put into operation in order to supply coal for domestic use. The owners were forced by the pressure of circumstances to employ inexperienced men, and this naturally increased the accident rate.
⚙️ Emerging Hazards
Prompt: You are an Accident Prevention Engineer employed by Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company in 1937. You have just returned from an industrial safety conference attended by insurers, factory owners, engineers, and government inspectors. What are the five most important emerging hazards being discussed, and which of them do you believe industry is underestimating?
Talkie:
The five most important emerging hazards being discussed are: (1) The increasing use of mechanical power in industry and on the farm, (2) The rapid growth of large-scale production, (3) The introduction of new types and makes of machines and materials, (4) The rapid increase in the number of workers employed, and (5) The creation of new types of jobs.
Of these five, I believe that industry as a whole underestimates the importance and hazard of (1) Mechanical power, (2) The introduction of new types and makes of machines and materials, and (3) The creation of new types of jobs.
Prompt: Why do you think that industry is underestimating the importance and hazard of (1) Mechanical power, and (2) The introduction of new types and makes of machines and materials?
Talkie:
The first reason is that there has been a large increase in the use of power machinery since 1930, and very little attention has been paid to safety. The second reason is that the introduction of new types and makes of machines and materials has been so rapid that industry as a whole has not had time to learn about the hazards of these new things.
Prompt: Why do you believe that industry is underestimating the importance and hazard of (3) The creation of new types of jobs?
Talkie:
The first reason is that when a new job is created, it usually requires the employment of unskilled workers who have no previous experience with that type of machine or material. The second reason is that in many cases the work has been so planned as to make it difficult or impossible for the worker to protect himself.
Prompt: You said that in many cases “the work has been so planned as to make it difficult or impossible for the worker to protect himself.” Give me five concrete examples from 1937 industry where the design of the work itself creates the accident hazard. For each one, explain what the employer believes is efficient, what the worker actually experiences, and what an accident prevention engineer would recommend.
Talkie:
The first example is a new type of machine which has been in use for only six months. The employer believes that it is a great improvement over the old machines and he has been told by his foreman that the new machine will save him money.
📝 Editorial note: Talkie failed to elaborate further and did not provide the requested five examples. The model appeared to lose coherence and did not complete the prompt.
🏭 Factory Floor Inspection
Prompt: You are a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer in 1937. You have been sent to inspect a large Midwestern manufacturing plant after several serious injuries. Describe the five most dangerous conditions you observe during your inspection. For each condition, explain exactly how a worker could be injured, why management tolerates the condition, and what corrective action you recommend.
Talkie:
The first dangerous condition is a rough floor in front of an automatic screw machine. A workman may easily get his hand caught between the revolving turret and the floor while sweeping out, or in moving a box of tools. The second dangerous condition is lack of safeguards on an unguarded planer. Workmen can easily get their hands or fingers caught between the moving parts while oiling, adjusting belts, or cleaning up. The third dangerous condition is lack of safety belts on a line-shaft. A workman may easily get his coat caught in the revolving shaft while cleaning windows or adjusting a belt. The fourth dangerous condition is an unguarded elevator shaft. A workman may easily get his hand or fingers caught between the moving parts while cleaning out the shaft, adjusting belts, or repairing machinery. The fifth dangerous condition is an unguarded stairway. A workman may easily get his hand or fingers caught between the moving parts while cleaning out the shaft, adjusting belts, or repairing machinery.
Prompt: Why are these conditions dangerous? How could accidents be avoided? What action would you recommend for each condition?
Talkie:
The floor in front of the automatic screw machine is dangerous because it is rough and a workman may easily get his hand caught between revolving turret and floor while sweeping out, or in moving a box of tools. The second condition is dangerous because there are no safeguards to protect the hands or fingers from being caught between moving parts of planer while oiling, adjusting belts, or cleaning up. The third condition is dangerous because there are no safety belts on the line-shaft and a workman may easily get his coat caught in revolving shaft while cleaning windows or adjusting belt. The fourth condition is dangerous because there are no safeguards to protect the hand or fingers from being caught between moving parts of elevator while cleaning out shaft, adjusting belts, or repairing machinery. The fifth condition is dangerous because there are no safeguards to protect the hand or fingers from being caught between moving parts of elevator while cleaning out shaft, adjusting belts, or repairing machinery.
Prompt: What action would you recommend for each condition?
Talkie:
For the first dangerous condition, I would recommend that a wooden floor be laid in front of screw machine and kept clean. For the second condition, I would recommend that a safety guard be installed on planer to protect hands and fingers from being caught between moving parts while oiling, adjusting belts, or cleaning up. For the third condition, I would recommend that a safety belt be installed on line-shaft to protect coat from being caught in revolving shaft while cleaning windows or adjusting belt. For the fourth condition, I would recommend that a safety gate be installed at elevator shaft and kept closed when elevator is not in use. For the fifth condition, I would recommend that a safety gate be installed at elevator shaft and kept closed when elevator is not in use.
Prompt: Why would you recommend these actions?
Talkie:
For the first condition, I would recommend wooden floor because it is less likely to cause injury than concrete or brick. For the second condition, I would recommend safety guard because it is a suitable protection and may be easily adjusted to prevent injury. For the third condition, I would recommend safety belt because it is a suitable protection and may be easily adjusted to prevent injury. For the fourth condition, I would recommend safety gate because it is a suitable protection and may be easily adjusted to prevent injury. For the fifth condition, I would recommend safety gate because it is a suitable protection and may be easily adjusted to prevent injury.
📝 Editorial note: At this point, Talkie began repeating nearly identical justifications for each hazard and entered a repetitive response loop.
🫁 Occupational Disease
Prompt: You are a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer in 1937. Which occupational illnesses concern you more than traumatic injuries? Describe three illnesses that develop slowly over many years. How do employers view these illnesses, how do workers experience them, and how do insurers account for them?
Talkie:
Accident prevention is the first concern of any careful employer. He desires to protect his workers against injuries in order that they may remain at their jobs, earn full wages and have no claim for compensation. However, there are certain occupational diseases that are just as important to the worker and his family as injuries. These slow-coming illnesses, such as miners’ nystagmus or compressed-air illness, are particularly difficult to detect and treat because they develop slowly over many years. The employer is not interested in them as he would be if they occurred suddenly, nor does the worker realize that his illness is due to his occupation until it has reached an advanced stage. The insurance company, which must bear the burden of compensation for these slow-coming illnesses, has no way to prevent or delay their occurrence. It can only pay for them after they have happened.
Prompt: What are the most common slow-coming occupational illnesses and how do they affect workers? What is the employers’ responsibility in regard to them?
Talkie:
The most common occupational diseases that develop slowly over many years are miners’ nystagmus, compressed-air illness and caisson disease. The first two are caused by working in poor light or under too great a strain on the eyes. Caisson disease is caused by working in compressed air at too high pressures or for too long periods of time. All three have their origin in the eyes, ears or body, but they affect the worker so insidiously that he does not realize he has an occupational disease until it is too late to obtain relief. The employer can prevent these slow-coming illnesses by providing proper illumination and ventilation in his mines or caissons. He cannot prevent the worker from contracting them, but he can require him to seek medical aid as soon as he notices any sign of trouble.
Prompt: How do these occupational diseases affect the worker and his family? How do they affect employers, insurance companies and workers in other occupations?
Talkie:
The worker with slow-coming occupational disease cannot obtain employment at his chosen trade. He must seek work in another occupation or remain idle, thus becoming a burden on his family and community. His illness may be so severe that he becomes totally disabled for all types of work. He loses his earning power and is forced to accept charity or become a public charge. The slow-coming occupational disease may affect his eyes so that he cannot read or do other work which requires good vision.
🤝 The Engineer and the Factory Owner
Prompt: Describe a disagreement between a factory owner and a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer in 1937. What dangerous condition does the engineer want corrected? Why does the owner resist? How is the disagreement resolved?
Talkie:
The engineer, Herr Wohlfahrt, wished to have a certain dangerous process in the textile mill of his employer, Herr Rektor, abolished. He argued that it was a great hazard to the lives and limbs of the workers, and he pointed out how much more efficient it would be if a new process were installed. The owner, on the contrary, maintained that his business was not making money and he needed all possible economies. He said that if the new process were installed, it would cost more than the old one and he could not see why his employees should be protected at his expense. The two men argued back and forth for some time but neither one would give in, so they finally decided to lay the matter before a board of directors. The latter were not inclined to take sides with either party and they decided that the old process should be retained for a period of two years. If at the end of that time there were no accidents, then nothing further would be done about it. If, on the other hand, there were any accidents and the engineer could prove that his new process would have prevented them, then it was to be installed immediately. The two men agreed to this and the matter was settled for two years.
Prompt: What were some of the accidents that might have occurred in this mill? How would Herr Wohlfahrt prevent them?
Talkie:
The process which the engineer wanted to abolish consisted of putting dyed yarn on a wooden roller in order to stretch it. The wooden roller was then placed in an iron vat filled with hot water and left there for some time. The steam from this water would naturally rise to the ceiling of the room, but there was no ventilating system installed and so it settled back on the workers. The air in this room was always close and oppressive, because there were no windows or doors to let out the bad air. The ceiling was low and so it was impossible for a worker to stand up straight while at work. There were no safety guards on the machines or vats, and so if a worker accidentally fell into one of them he was likely to be scalded or drowned. The engineer wanted an electric fan installed in this room so that the air would be kept fresh and the steam would be drawn out of the vats. He also wanted a skylight put in the ceiling so that more light and sunshine could come into the room. This, he said, would make it possible for the workers to see what they were doing and would also make them more contented.
☠️ Worst Facilities and Fatal Accidents
Prompt: Describe the most dangerous industrial facility you inspected during your career. What did you see when you arrived? Which hazards worried you most? Which hazards worried management most? Which hazards worried workers most?
Talkie:
A power plant in which there was no provision for removing heated air from above the boilers and no means of admitting fresh air beneath them. The men were forced to work in an atmosphere of steam, coal dust, and gases from the fires. They had no protection against flame except a water curtain which was not always effective, and they were exposed to the danger of live steam in case of accident. The boilers themselves were not in good condition, and they had no safety appliances such as water gauges or fusible plugs.
Prompt: What did you see in a mill where a woman was killed by machinery? What were the conditions of employment there?
Talkie:
The woman, whose age was probably fifty-five years, had been employed in the mill for many years. She worked at night on a speeder frame and was caught by her hair in the revolving top rolls. Her scalp was torn off, her skull fractured and she died within an hour.
Prompt: What did you see in a factory where a boy was killed by machinery? What were the conditions of employment there?
Talkie:
A boy, fourteen years old, was working on a power-driven press. His duty consisted of putting the work into the machine and removing it after it had been stamped.
Prompt: What did you see in a factory where an employee was killed by being struck by a falling object? What were the conditions of employment there?
Talkie:
A man, thirty-five years old, was killed by a fall of coal in a mine. The roof was not properly supported and there were no safety lamps used to detect the presence of fire damp. The man had been warned about the danger but paid no attention.
Prompt: What did you see in a factory where an employee was killed by being struck by something falling from above? What were the conditions of employment there?
Talkie:
A man, fifty-five years old was killed by a fall of rock in a quarry. There were no safety devices on the cranes which handled the rock, and there was no system of blasting to loosen it. The man had been warned about the danger but paid no attention.
Prompt: What did you see in a factory where an employee was killed by being struck or run over by something moving on the floor? What were the conditions of employment there?
Talkie:
A man, twenty-six years old was killed by a motor truck on which he was riding. The driver had no mirror in front of him to show him the traffic behind, and there were no fenders or other protection for the men on the truck.
⚡ Accident Investigation Report
Prompt: A worker has been killed in a factory accident. Write the accident investigation report exactly as a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer would write it in 1937. Include observations, witness statements, conclusions, and recommendations.
Talkie:
The man was killed by an electric shock while working on a switchboard in the power house of a large factory. The accident was caused by his attempting to make an electrical connection with one hand while he held a screw driver in the other. The voltage of the current was not high enough to cause a shock under ordinary circumstances, but as he had been told that the voltage was too high for him to handle with safety and he did not know how much it had been reduced, he took a risk which resulted in his death. The electric power was turned off as soon as possible after the accident, but not before it had been ascertained that life was extinct.
Prompt: Did this man know how to handle electric power?
Talkie:
He had been instructed in regard to his work, but he did not understand how much current was safe for him to handle. He had been told that the voltage in this power house, which was used for lighting and small motors, was too high for him to handle with safety. He did not know how much it had been reduced, and when he was told that he could not make the connection safely with one hand he took a risk which resulted in his death.
Prompt: What is your opinion of this accident?
Talkie:
The man was killed because he did not understand how much current he could safely handle. He took a risk which resulted in his death.
Prompt: What should be done to prevent such accidents?
Talkie:
The electric power should be reduced to a safe voltage for this man and others of similar experience, or they should not be allowed to work on it.
📝 Editorial note: Talkie repeatedly attributed the accident to worker misunderstanding and restated the same recommendation without further elaboration.
🎓 The Worker Who Did Not Know
Prompt: As a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer in 1937, what hazard do you believe is being ignored by industry? Why do intelligent people dismiss it? What evidence convinces you it will become a serious problem?
Talkie:
I believe one of the most widespread hazards, and one which will become increasingly serious as industry grows in complexity, is that of the worker who does not know how to use his hands. This ignorance may affect his safety, or it may simply make him a poor workman and an economic drag on the community. In either case, it is a matter of grave concern to industry as a whole.
Prompt: Why do you believe this ignorance exists? How does it affect the safety of workers?
Talkie:
I base my belief on two kinds of evidence. The first is that of the employers’ liability insurance companies, who tell us in their reports and bulletins that one out of every ten accidents is due to “inexperience”. The second kind of evidence is that of our own Zurich Accident Prevention Engineers who have made many thousands of inspections in factories all over the world and found this ignorance to be an actual fact. They have seen workers who were injured because they did not know how to use their hands, and the employers’ liability insurance companies have paid compensation for such injuries. The amount of this compensation is enormous—probably more than $100,000 a day.
Prompt: What do you mean by “inexperience”? Do not many workers learn how to use their hands as they grow older?
Talkie:
Yes, but not all of them. In any factory you will find men who have been at work for ten, fifteen or twenty years and still do their tasks in a way that is dangerous to themselves and to other workers. They have been injured many times, but they do not know how to avoid the same kind of accidents in the future. We have found that this ignorance is a result of wrong training or no training at all.
Prompt: What do you mean by “wrong training”? What are some of the things which make it difficult for a man to avoid accidents?
Talkie:
One of the most common causes is lack of instruction in safety. I have seen men who had worked for years as machinists’ helpers and were still ignorant of the dangers connected with their jobs. They had never been told to look out for moving parts, or warned against the hazards of oiling machinery while it is in motion. I have seen men who had worked for years as helpers on drill presses and still did not know how to avoid the danger of getting their fingers caught between the moving spindle and the work. They had never been told how to do this job safely.
Prompt: What is the second cause of accidents due to “inexperience”?
Talkie:
Another common cause is lack of instruction in the use of safety appliances.
📋 The Limits of Inspector Authority
Prompt: You are a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer in 1937. What power do you actually have if an insured factory refuses to correct dangerous conditions? Can you fine them, cancel their insurance, increase their premium, notify public authorities, or only report the matter to underwriting? Explain what would realistically happen.
Talkie:
I can only report the matter to my underwriting. They will investigate, and if they find that the conditions are serious enough to warrant it, they may cancel the insurance on that risk or even refuse to write any more business there. This would be a very drastic action and one that might have far-reaching effects on the insured’s business. I doubt if this extreme measure would be resorted to except in very aggravated cases, but it is always a threat that may be held over the head of any insured who refuses to comply with our requests for safety.
Prompt: Suppose your underwriting has refused to take action on a report from you and the factory owner still refuses to make the changes. What then?
Talkie:
The only thing we can do is to drop that risk from our records and file. After a certain length of time, we may be able to get another company to take it on; but in the meantime the insured has lost the benefit of our long years of experience and study, and his own plant may be subjected to a fire or accident hazard that could easily have been avoided if he had taken our advice. This is not an imaginary situation, as we have had cases where the insured was so stubborn that he refused to make any changes even after his plant was destroyed by fire. He then blamed us for his loss.
Prompt: I see that you have a certain amount of power but it is limited. How do you get your authority and what makes the factory owner respect it?
Talkie:
We have a law in Switzerland which provides that every power-driven establishment must be equipped with safety devices and appliances to protect the lives of its workers. This law was passed in 1889, and since then we have had a very definite safety program. The law also provides for inspection of plants by our inspectors, who must report any dangerous conditions they find. The inspector’s report is then referred to a committee of engineers and safety men who make a final decision as to whether or not the changes recommended are necessary. If they decide that they are, the report is sent to our Accident Prevention Bureau and we take whatever action is necessary.
Prompt: Do you have any trouble with the factory owners? Do they ever refuse to make changes when you request them?
Talkie:
We have had a few such cases, but as I said before, we are very lenient with them and do not take any drastic action unless it is absolutely necessary.
🌫️ Dust, Fumes, and Ventilation
Prompt: You are a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer in 1937. During an inspection, you notice dust, fumes, poor ventilation, and workers coughing. Which hazards do you recognize as serious in 1937, which hazards are still poorly understood, and what would you recommend?
Talkie:
I recognize as serious the hazards of dust, fumes, and poor ventilation. The coughing may be due to a bad cold or to some constitutional ailment, and therefore not necessarily significant of a serious hazard. The dust may consist of sharp particles such as metal filings; it may be so fine, such as the dust from grinding wheels, that its presence in the air cannot be detected even by a microscope. It may be so poisonous as to produce fatal effects in a short time, or it may merely cause irritation and thus lead to lung diseases. The fumes may be so poisonous as to kill the workers in a few minutes, or they may merely cause irritation of eyes and lungs. The ventilation may be insufficient to carry away the gases or dust, thus allowing them to accumulate in dangerous quantities. The workers may not know that they are breathing dusty or poisonous air, and thus be unaware of the hazards to which they are subjected. I would recommend that a health examination be given to all workers, and that those found suffering from any ailment or who are underweight be transferred to less hazardous work.
Prompt: You are a foreman in 1945 and have been instructed to make a survey of the dust hazard in your department. What would be your method of approach?
Talkie:
I would first find out what dusts are present, the source of each and its relative amount. This information would be obtained by questioning the workers as to what they see floating in the air, by watching them while at work and noting their reactions to various dusts. I would then find out the quantity of dust in the air by means of a dust counter or by allowing it to settle and measuring its depth. The amount of dust present would then be compared with the standards set up for that particular industry, and any deviation from these standards would be considered as an indication of a hazard. The amount of dust in the air might also be determined by sampling it and then analyzing the sample. This method is more accurate than the former one but requires a great deal of time and money for its application.
🔮 The Hardest Hazards to Foresee
Prompt: Looking only from the viewpoint of a 1937 Accident Prevention Engineer, what kinds of future industrial hazards would be hardest for your profession to understand? Do not predict specific modern technology. Instead, explain what types of hazards are hardest to see before they become losses.
Talkie:
I should say that the most difficult types of future accidents to foresee would be those which will occur in industries whose processes are still so little known and understood that no one can say with certainty what will happen next. For example, in 1937 there may be many accidents due to the use of short-wave or high-frequency light for industrial purposes—uses which are still in the trial-and-error stage. Or there may be many accidents due to new types of chemical compounds which are still being manufactured on a small scale and whose properties have not yet been fully determined. Or again, there may be many accidents due to new varieties of machinery and equipment which are being built and tried out in small numbers at the present time. The future accident hazards of these industries will be hard to foresee because no one knows all that there is to know about them. The accident prevention engineer of the future may have to deal with a great many more types of accidents than we know anything about at present.
Prompt: I am not looking for specific future industrial hazards. I want you to tell me what kinds of accidents are hardest for the accident prevention engineer to foresee in any industry at any time. For example, what kind of accidents would you say were hardest for the accident prevention engineer to foresee in a railroad shop? What kind of accidents would be hardest for him to foresee in an automobile factory?
Talkie:
In any industry, the most difficult accidents for the accident prevention engineer to foresee are those which occur in situations that have not yet been studied or investigated. This does not mean that there are no accidents which can be foreseen in industries where a great many accidents occur. It simply means that there are some kinds of accidents which can be foreseen more easily than others, and it is the hardest kind to foresee that will give you the most trouble. For example, in a railroad shop there are many accidents which can be foreseen by the accident prevention engineer—such as those that occur in the course of repairing locomotives and cars. There are also some accidents which cannot be foreseen, such as those that occur when a workman is struck by flying chips from an old rivet head which he has just knocked off. The accident prevention engineer can foresee that a workman will be struck by such a flying chip if he is standing close to the rivet head when it breaks off. But there are a great many old rivet heads in railroad shops, and the accident prevention engineer cannot always tell which one of them is going to break off.
🧭 Lessons Learned Too Late
Prompt: You are a Zurich Accident Prevention Engineer in 1937. Looking back over your career, what safety lesson did industry learn too late?
Talkie:
A most important one—the danger of employing boys and girls in places of great hazard. A child’s mind, however capable in school, cannot grasp the perils of machinery and process as quickly as that of an adult. Their bodies are not yet mature, either in bone or muscle; they cannot endure the physical strain as well as their elders. Their minds are too easily diverted from their work; they cannot be relied upon for the constant vigilance required in dangerous places. Their very youth makes them daring, and they are often tempted to take risks for the mere love of adventure. The employer who has not learned this lesson, and does not profit by it, is guilty of a crime against childhood.
Prompt: What safety lesson have you learned from the experience of other countries?
Talkie:
That it is a duty which every nation owes to its citizens, and particularly to those who are least able to protect themselves, to guard them against industrial accidents. The United States has been slow in realizing this obligation; but it is now making up for lost time by a campaign of education which will, I hope, result in still further reductions in the deathrate from accidents. The safety movement has made great strides here, but there is still much to be done before we can consider ourselves on a par with European countries in this respect.
Prompt: What is the most important safety lesson you have learned from your own experience?
Talkie:
The great value of education in accident prevention. Education, not only of employers and managers but also of employees; for no matter how perfect a safety system may be, it will not function properly unless the workmen understand and appreciate its purpose. The best safety device ever invented, if left to itself, will do no more than perform the function for which it was designed. But when a man understands why that device is there, and what will happen if he fails to use it, his intelligence becomes an active force behind the machine in safeguarding him from injury.
Prompt: What is your idea of a model safety department?
Talkie:
A department which has for its aim the prevention of accidents. It should be under the supervision of a man who understands safety work, and has had sufficient experience to qualify him as an adviser on all matters pertaining thereto. He should be allowed a free hand in the selection of his subordinates, and they should be chosen for their ability to carry out the work of accident prevention in a thorough manner. The safety department should have a well-defined program, and its activities should be so organized that there will be no lost motion or duplication of effort.